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DUN & BRADSTREET V. GREENMOSS BUILDERS AS AN 
EXAMPLE OF JUSTICE POWELL’S APPROACH TO 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
Paul M. Smith 
It is striking to read the detailed account of the Supreme Court’s 
wrestling with Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.1 over 
a two-year period that came just a few years after I had the honor of 
clerking for Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. The unpacking of this story by 
Lee Levine and Stephen Wermiel is invaluable because it so well 
illustrates the ways in which three important Justices did their jobs in the 
1970s and 1980s.2 We see Justice Brennan working strategically to 
reinforce and extend his earlier opinion in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,3 seeking ways to cobble together five votes from a Court that is 
far different from the Warren Court he once knew. We see Justice 
White, mercurial and idiosyncratic—first voting with Justice Brennan, 
then flirting with joining Justice Powell in narrowing the scope of Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc.,4 and ultimately filing a concurrence in the
judgment calling for both Sullivan and Gertz to be overruled.5 And we 
see Justice Powell, the classic moderate centrist, seeking to adjust the 
constitutional rules so as to give what he considered sufficient respect to 
competing values—here, the competing values of protecting freedom of 
speech and preserving the States’ ability to use defamation law to protect 
reputations. 
Given this welcome opportunity to comment on the Levine and 
Wermiel account, I thought I would use it to offer some thoughts about 
Justice Powell’s approach to constitutional jurisprudence, particularly in 
First Amendment cases—an approach well illustrated by the story of 
 Clerk for Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 1980 Term; Partner, Jenner & Block LLP; Chair of the 
firm’s Appellate and Supreme Court practice; awarded the D.C. Bar’s Thurgood Marshall Award in 
2012 and the ABA IR&R Section’s Thurgood Marshall Award in 2010. 
1. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
2. Lee Levine & Stephen Wermiel, The Landmark that Wasn’t: A First Amendment Play in Five
Acts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
4. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
5. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 765–74 (White, J., concurring).
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Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.6 
I.  JUSTICE POWELL AS A CENTRIST 
It is hardly a great insight to note that Justice Powell was a centrist—
though in his time on the Court the ideological divides were not so clear 
and other Justices—Stewart, Stevens, White, and Blackmun—each 
found themselves taking both “liberal” and “conservative” positions in 
various cases. What is distinctive about Justice Powell is not just that he 
shifted back and forth between liberal and conservative majorities but 
that he nearly always sought to find a way to avoid, or minimize, the 
choice by crafting a middle position. 
Perhaps the most famous example of this approach was Powell’s 
opinion in Board of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.7 In 
that much-criticized but still influential opinion, he voted to invalidate a 
university’s affirmative action program that employed a quota or goal 
concerning the percentage of the class that should be made of minority 
students.8 But he simultaneously endorsed consideration of race as one 
factor in the overall individualized determination about each applicant.9 
This splitting of the difference was designed to avoid the overt 
categorization of people by their race while still allowing some play in 
the joints for the reality that diversity in education would not be 
achieved without some awareness of race in the admissions process. It 
allowed the Court to avoid shutting down diversity efforts while 
recognizing at the same time how constitutionally problematic it is for 
the State to favor and disfavor people based on race. 
The Bakke opinion was adopted as the model for affirmative action 
programs across the country for an entire generation. And it was adopted 
by Justice Powell’s intellectual heir on the Court, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, when she wrote the majority opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger10 
upholding the affirmative action program of the University of Michigan 
Law School.11 As I write this piece, the Bakke/Grutter era may be about 
                                                     
6. 472 U.S. 749. 
7. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
8. Id. at 379. 
9. Id. at 318–19. 
10. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
11. Id. at 343. To be sure, Justice O’Connor arguably was less clear than Justice Powell about 
limiting the justification for affirmative action to the producing of educational benefits through 
diversity in the classroom. As Charles Fried put it: 
In 1978, in the Bakke case, Justice Lewis Powell ruled that the use of race—whether motivated 
by ameliorative purposes or bigotry—was constitutionally suspect and required the most 
 
10 - Smith Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/15/2013  3:05 PM 
2013] AN EXAMPLE OF JUSTICE POWELL’S APPROACH 145 
 
to come to an end as a Court that no longer includes Justice O’Connor is 
revisiting these questions in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.12 
But I expect Justice Powell always foresaw the day when his 
compromise approach would no longer carry the day. Indeed, he 
probably welcomed it. In any event, what is clear is that Justice Powell’s 
Bakke opinion typifies his quest for rules that “split the difference” 
between competing considerations—including (as Greenmoss illustrates) 
in First Amendment cases. 
II.  JUSTICE POWELL AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The instinct to find a middle path played a significant role in Justice 
Powell’s First Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, it is fair to say that 
Justice Powell’s voice played an important role in nearly every 
important free speech and free press case during his fifteen-year tenure, 
generally in the service of finding a way to respect legitimate 
governmental and private interests and giving sufficient respect as well 
to First Amendment values. 
As Gerald Gunther has put it: 
Over the fifteen years since, Lewis Powell has made ever greater 
contributions to coherent first amendment analysis. In no other 
area has he demonstrated more persuasively that a balancing 
approach can provide not only the more intellectually satisfying 
analysis but also the one most sensitive to individual rights. 
Balancing is often denigrated as being too ad hoc, as providing 
too little general guidance, as too ready to sustain first 
amendment infringements. It need not be that: admirable first 
amendment balancing features an alert and generous perception 
                                                     
compelling justification, a justification that the wish to approach proportionality or to 
overcome past discrimination could not satisfy. This was, in Justice Powell’s words, 
“discrimination for its own sake.” Race could be considered, however, to achieve diversity in 
the classroom in deference to a university’s First Amendment right to academic freedom. 
Charles Fried, Courting Confusion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004, at A29. It was the dissenters in 
Bakke, Fried noted, who justified affirmative action as a tool to overcome the legacy of slavery and 
racism. Id. In Grutter, Fried argued, the Court: 
[R]evisited the issue in the same setting as the Bakke case—and promptly seized both horns of 
the dilemma. Swearing allegiance to Justice Powell’s principles and delivering a lecture about 
the evil of quotas, it nonetheless endorsed the law school’s transparent evasion of those 
principles, emphasizing the necessity of ensuring substantial minority representation not only 
in the classroom but also in industry, the military and public life—the very purposes he had 
denounced. 
Id. 
12. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3144 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-
345). 
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of the free speech elements in each controversy and a fair and 
careful evaluation of each asserted state justification for 
restraint.13 
Justice Powell moved the Court toward a balanced approach to free 
speech in two ways—through concurrences and through the majority 
opinions he happened to be assigned. 
First, there was the series of concurrences that began almost 
immediately in 1972 with the famous Powell concurrence in Branzburg 
v. Hayes.14 These concurrences, which continued with Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc.15 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,16 FCC v. 
Pacifica Foundation,17 and Herbert v. Lando,18 all followed a familiar 
pattern. All of these cases were ones in which a Court majority rejected a 
First Amendment claim by the media. Justice Powell voted with the 
majority, usually with the controlling vote, and either joined in the 
majority’s reasoning or only in the result. Either way, he sought to recast 
the majority’s rejection of the First Amendment claim as less than 
absolute. In Branzburg, Zurcher, and Herbert, which all involved some 
sort of claim that the press needed to be shielded from inquiry into its 
inner workings lest First Amendment values be sacrificed, Justice 
Powell’s view was always that reporters could be called to tell grand 
juries about sources,19 could have their offices searched pursuant to a 
warrant,20 and could have their editorial processes uncovered through 
                                                     
13. Gerald Gunther, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 HARV. L. REV. 409, 411 
(1987). 
14. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
15. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
16. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
17. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
18. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). 
19. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring). Branzburg actually involved three 
different cases. In one, reporter Paul Branzburg had been directed by the courts of Kentucky to 
disclose to a grand jury information about drug manufacture and use that he had personally 
witnessed after giving guarantees of confidentiality. Id. at 667 (majority opinion). In another, 
reporter Paul Pappas had been ordered by the courts of Massachusetts to disclose to a grand jury 
information about his visit inside a Black Panther Party headquarters during a time of civil 
disturbance. Id. at 672–73. In the third, reporter Earl Caldwell had persuaded the Ninth Circuit that 
the First Amendment shielded him from having to testify to a grand jury about his confidential 
interactions with Black Panthers in California. Id. at 675–78. Justice White wrote the opinion of the 
Court, rejecting the notion that reporters enjoy any greater privilege shielding them from grand jury 
subpoenas than any other citizen. Justice Powell joined the opinion while seeming to contradict it by 
calling for weighing of First Amendment values in every case. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). 
20. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 568–70 (Powell, J., concurring). Zurcher involved a search of the 
editorial offices of the Stanford Daily student newspaper seeking photographs of a demonstration 
that had occurred on the Stanford campus. Id. at 550–52 (majority opinion). As with Branzburg, 
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discovery in libel litigation.21 In each case Justice Powell indicated that 
reporters should have access to a judicial remedy. The relevant judicial 
officer should weigh the importance of the information sought against 
the First Amendment costs of allowing the inquiry, and reach and 
suitable decision on the particular facts presented. 
The Branzburg concurrence was quite influential. Justice White, 
writing for the Court, had said that there is no basis in the First 
Amendment for a privilege protecting reporters from being subpoenaed 
by a grand jury and asked to reveal their confidential sources.22 Justice 
Powell, the fifth vote for the majority, joined the Court’s opinion but 
then wrote a concurrence saying that in each case courts deciding 
whether to enforce subpoenas should consider First Amendment 
values.23 This caused many courts over the years to impose a pretty 
heavy burden of justification on law enforcement officials seeking to 
compel testimony about confidential sources.24 
                                                     
Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court, holding that there is no special protection for the press 
from searches pursuant to warrants. Justice Powell concurred in the White opinion while stating that 
magistrates deciding whether to authorize searches of editorial offices should consider independent 
First Amendment values. Id. at 569–70 (Powell, J., concurring). 
21. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 178 (Powell, J., concurring). Herbert involved the question of whether a 
plaintiff in a libel suit against a newspaper or media company may use discovery to inquire into the 
editorial processes of the defendant. Id. at 155 (majority opinion). Here again, Justice White wrote 
the opinion of the Court, and Justice Powell joined that opinion while saying that First Amendment 
values should be weighed on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 177–80 (Powell, J., concurring). 
22. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682. 
23. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). 
24. See Adam Liptak, A Justice’s Scribbles on Journalists’ Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/weekinreview/07liptak.html (“Though Justice Powell’s 
concurrence was almost perfectly opaque, press lawyers seized on it and for decades convinced 
countless lower courts that Branzburg had in fact been a victory for the press.”). Examples of such 
cases include United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998), Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 
1289, 1292–93 (9th Cir. 1993), and von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987). This 
pattern largely ended with Judge Posner’s opinion for the Seventh Circuit in McKevitt v. Pallasch, 
339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003), in which he noted that the majority in Branzburg had not endorsed a 
reporter’s privilege and then refused to do so in the present case. Id. at 532–35. 
Justice Powell’s use of concurrences to affect the merits of a case was not always so successful. 
In a remarkable, though obscure, 1981 decision involving the liability of ship owners to 
longshoremen, Justice White wrote a majority opinion that did not clearly decide which of two 
groups of conflicting circuit decisions was right. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 
451 U.S. 156 (1981). Justice Brennan concurred based on his reading of the opinion as supporting 
the more liberal rule of liability. Id. at 179–80 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Powell concurred 
based on his reading that it supported the more restrictive rule of liability. Id. at 180–81 (Powell, J., 
concurring). Justice White did not clarify the matter and simply allowed his opinion to issue. More 
effective, but more difficult to explain, was Justice O’Connor’s use of the technique to modify the 
meaning of her own opinion. In Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996), O’Connor wrote and signed the 
controlling plurality opinion holding a congressional district map unconstitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. She then added her own concurring opinion elaborating on some points 
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In Young25 and Pacifica,26 which involved more content-based 
regulation of speech, Justice Powell’s goal was to moderate the degree 
of the rejection of the First Amendment claim. Young involved a zoning 
ordinance limiting the locations in which “adult” movie theaters could 
be located in the City of Detroit.27 Justice Stevens, writing for a five-
Justice majority, upheld the law, reasoning that the First Amendment 
provides somewhat lesser protection to sexually explicit and erotic 
speech than to core political speech.28 Justice Powell did not join in that 
creation of a First Amendment double-standard, instead concluding that 
a zoning ordinance, albeit one that draws distinctions based on the 
content of speech, imposes only incidental burdens on speech.29 He 
applied the standard test for incidental burdens on speech, derived from 
United States v. O’Brien.30 
Similarly, in Pacifica, involving the constitutionality of the FCC’s 
punishment of a daytime broadcast of George Carlin’s notorious “Filthy 
Words” monologue, Justice Stevens again wrote the lead opinion for the 
Court and again argued that sexually explicit but non-obscene speech is 
less valuable than other forms of speech and should be accorded lesser 
protection.31 Justice Powell in his concurrence again did not join that 
portion of the Stevens opinion, instead reasoning that the uniquely 
intrusive character of broadcasting sufficed to justify the FCC in 
demanding that a program as vulgar and offensive as the Carlin 
monologue be broadcast only in the late evening when it is less likely to 
be heard by children.32 One effect of this concurrence was to create a 
perception that the authorization of FCC regulation of indecency was 
limited to broadcasts like the Carlin monologue—and not just fleeting 
expletives or images. To use the Justice’s colorful term, the monologue 
was “verbal shock treatment.”33 
                                                     
raised in the plurality opinion. Id. at 990–95 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
25. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
26. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).  
27. Young, 427 U.S. at 50. 
28. Young, 427 U.S. at 70. 
29. Id. at 73–84 (Powell, J., concurring). 
30. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (“[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within 
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.”). 
31. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 743 (citing Young, 427 U.S. 50). 
32. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 755–62 (Powell, J., concurring). 
33. Id. at 757. 
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Then there is the series of important majority opinions written by 
Justice Powell in First Amendment cases. These also fall into two 
categories. Some were ringing endorsements of First Amendment 
claims, particularly on behalf of corporations. In First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti34 and again in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission of California,35 Justice Powell, writing for the 
Court, strongly rejected efforts by government to prevent corporations 
from spending money to speak out on the issues of the day or to require 
them to sponsor and distribute the speech of others. And in Erznoznik v. 
City of Jacksonville,36 Justice Powell wrote a majority opinion 
invalidating as overbroad an ordinance barring all exhibition of nudity in 
films shown in drive-in theaters.37 
The other category is the celebrated pair of cases in which Justice 
Powell attempted to craft categorical rules that balance First Amendment 
interests with competing interests. One of those, of course, was Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc.,38 the libel case that plays a central role in the story 
told by Levine and Wermiel. In Gertz, Justice Powell, in his early days 
as a Justice, took on the task of laying out a series of rules governing 
how the Constitution applies to defamation claims brought by private 
persons—i.e., persons who are neither public officials nor public figures. 
With the Court badly fractured, he worked to find a middle path that 
neither extended New York Times Co. v. Sullivan39 to this very different 
context nor withheld constitutional protection altogether when the media 
are sued by private figures. The solution, Justice Powell announced for a 
five-Justice majority, was to require some showing of fault—i.e., at least 
negligence—in all private figure cases, and to require Times v. Sullivan 
“actual malice” (knowing or reckless falsehood)40 if a state wanted to 
impose either presumed or punitive damages.41 
Although Justice Powell apparently began to feel that he had 
“legislated” too broadly in Gertz when Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.42 came along some years later, the reality is 
that the two-level system of constitutional protection provided to the 
                                                     
34. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
35. 475 U.S. 1 (1986). 
36. 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
37. Id. at 217. 
38. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
39. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
40. Id. at 280–81. 
41. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. 
42. 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
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media in public official/public figure cases and in private figure cases in 
the wake of Gertz has been sufficiently durable as a compromise 
position. The Court has not had occasion to revisit this for nearly four 
decades, except in the context of what the Greenmoss Court called 
speech of “purely private concern.”43 
The other great example of categorical balancing in Justice Powell’s 
First Amendment cases is Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission of New York.44 There, as a conservation 
measure, New York regulators had ordered electric utilities to cease 
advertising designed to promote consumption of electricity.45 They 
exempted “informational” advertising designed not to increase demand 
but to shift demand to times of low utilization.46 Justice Powell, writing 
for the Court, distilled from prior commercial speech cases a four-part 
test that has governed the constitutionality of commercial speech 
regulation ever since: 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is 
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to 
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful 
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the 
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries 
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the 
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, 
and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve 
that interest.47 
The Court held that the State’s energy conservation rationale was 
substantial and would be advanced by the speech regulation, but 
invalidated the regulation on the ground that it was overbroad—
extending to speech about products like electrical heating systems than 
might not increase demand at all.48 
Here, as in Gertz, Justice Powell went beyond merely calling for a 
balancing of interests and structured a test for allowing decision-making 
                                                     
43. Id. at 759. In 2011, the Supreme Court returned to the question whether a particular 
expression should be given robust First Amendment protection because it involves matters of public 
concern or should instead receive lesser protection because it involves a matter of private concern. 
See Snyder v. Phelps, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215–19 (2011) (holding that picketing at a 
military funeral, although including personal attacks on the deceased, was speech about matters of 
public concern).   
44. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
45. Id. at 558. 
46. Id. at 560. 
47. Id. at 566. 
48. Id. at 570. 
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about when the lesser protections accorded to commercial speech do and 
do not outweigh the government’s regulatory interests. It is a test 
designed to assure that neither the First Amendment nor regulatory 
interests gets short shrift. 
In Greenmoss, as Levine and Wermiel document, Justice Powell 
worked hard to adjust the rules he himself had laid out in Gertz based on 
a perception that they were too speech-protective when applied to speech 
by a private provider of business information like Dun & Bradstreet.49 
His focus was damages—the rules from Gertz that even in a case 
involving a non-public-figure plaintiff, actual damages had to be proved 
and punitive damages were forbidden unless actual malice had been 
shown.50 Powell tried a number of limiting principles, focusing at times 
on the non-media nature of the defendant and later attempting to 
uncouple punitive from presumed damages and pronounce different 
standards for each. Ultimately, he wrote a plurality opinion that simply 
relied on the assessment that the speech at issue was not of public 
concern and thus did not warrant constitutional protections against 
imposition of presumed and punitive damages.51 As we now know, that 
simple opinion was the end of a long road. 
FINAL THOUGHTS 
As this summary of Justice Powell’s First Amendment jurisprudence 
indicates, his approach exemplified what Cass Sunstein has called 
judicial “minimalism.”52 Louis Bilionis aptly summarized the 
characteristics of such an approach: 
The first feature is a close adherence to case-specific context 
that maximizes the identification of points and considerations 
that may be employed to construct a centrist and narrow 
resolution. The second is a preference for temporalizing 
maneuvers that permit decisions on socially controversial 
grounds to be deferred. The third is a predilection for doctrinal 
innovations that make standards of review more commodious, 
thereby facilitating more tightly contextual accommodations and 
compromises. The fourth feature is a reliance on rhetoric that 
presents the Court’s decisions as moderate, centrist outcomes 
                                                     
49. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760–61 (1985). 
50. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349–50 (1974). 
51. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. at 762–63. 
52. CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 
(1999). 
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that respect and give fair weight to all legitimate competing 
interests, without undue favor to any side in the social conflict.53 
A rather extreme, but perhaps not unfair, explanation of this approach is 
as follows: 
“[O]ne function of the Supreme Court must be to keep the peace 
between rival social groups adhering to rival and incompatible 
principles of justice by displaying a fairness which consists in 
even-handedness in its adjudications” . . . . To fulfill that 
function, the Court “play[s] the role of a peacemaking or truce-
keeping body by negotiating its way through an impasse of 
conflict, not by invoking our shared moral first principles. For 
our society as a whole has none.”54 
While I would not agree that Justice Powell saw the world solely in 
terms of competing interests or claims, it certainly is true that he often 
tried to give something to both sides. In some cases, such as Branzburg, 
Herbert, and Zurcher, the method was to call for a kind of ad hoc 
balancing on a case-by-case basis. Such a rule is easy to criticize. After 
all, it calls up a judge to weigh apples against oranges in an unstructured 
decision-making process. But it has the virtue of assuring that neither 
competing interest entirely trumps the other in every case. And the post-
Branzburg history of confidential source cases55 shows how lower courts 
can sometimes provide the structure for the balance themselves by 
developing tests to apply. The other method, of course, is formulating 
the test at the Supreme Court level, as in Gertz and Central Hudson Gas 
& Electric Corp. And as I have already suggested, such tests have 
proved to be both workable and long-lived accommodations. 
It may well be that such an approach is unpalatable to those who 
“expect their constitutional jurisprudence to proceed forthrightly and 
confidently from . . . principles” that reflect our shared constitutional 
values.56 Certainly there were times when Justice Powell’s caution and 
willingness to see both sides were frustrating to me as a young, generally 
liberal law clerk who admired the Warren Court and its leader, Justice 
William Brennan. But those traits also serve to explain how I always felt 
strongly that if Justice Powell and his approach to judging were to hold 
sway, the Republic would go on just fine. 
Interestingly, minimalist centrism stands in contrast with the approach 
                                                     
53. Louis Bilionis, Grand Centrism and the Centrist Judicial Personam, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1353, 
1356 (2005). 
54. Id. at 1355 (quoting ALASDAIR MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 253 (2d ed. 1984)). 
55. See supra note 24 for a discussion of cases. 
56. Bilionis, supra note 53, at 1357. 
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generally adopted by the current “swing Justice,” Justice Anthony 
Kennedy. Although he certainly at times acts as a moderating influence 
on those Justices inclined to adopt absolute constitutional rules,57 he is 
more often himself the proponent of sweeping rules. His centrist 
reputation primarily comes from the fact that he favors rules in different 
contexts that sometimes align him with the conservatives on the Court 
and sometimes with the liberals. He is, for example, the author both of 
the soaring rhetoric in Lawrence v. Texas,58 the landmark gay rights 
case, and of the majority opinion in Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders of the County of Burlington,59 where the Court held that 
there is no constitutional problem raised by strip-searching a man 
erroneously jailed for not paying a fine.60 
Justice Kennedy’s willingness to adopt robust rules is nowhere better 
illustrated than in free speech cases, where he is probably the most 
consistent supporter of speech rights since Justice Brennan. It is difficult, 
for example, to imagine Justice Powell writing Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State 
Crime Victims Board,61 where he objected to the application of strict 
constitutional scrutiny to a content-based burden on free speech, arguing 
that such a law is categorically unconstitutional.62 A more recent 
example is United States v. Alvarez,63 where Justice Kennedy wrote a 
plurality opinion applying strict constitutional scrutiny to a law that 
banned only intentionally false statements about having received a 
medal during military service.64 As Alvarez illustrates, the real judicial 
minimalist these days in First Amendment cases is Justice Breyer—who 
concurred in the result in Alvarez, applying an ad hoc balancing test.65 
If another Greenmoss were to come along next Term, one might 
expect to see Justice Kennedy reprising the role of Justice Brennan and 
Justice Breyer making stabs at finding the right intermediate rule. Justice 
Scalia might well be the one echoing Justice White’s critique of Sullivan 
                                                     
57. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387–95 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(acknowledging diversity as a legitimate educational goal and stating that affirmative action could 
be justified by a showing that there is no alternative method of reaching that goal). 
58. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
59. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012). 
60. Id. at 1522–23. 
61. 502 U.S. 105 (1991). 
62. Id. at 124–28 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
63. __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012). 
64. Id. at 2548. 
65. Id. at 2551–56 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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and Gertz. But the odds are good that the Court would come out again 
about where it did the last time. 
 
